We live in a time of science-denial. From the realities of covid-19 to climate change, childhood vaccines and even the shape of the earth, many people now seem to actively reject the authority of scientific experts. Philosophers often bemoan populist ignorance, but I will argue that this response evades the fundamentally rational core of science-denial. I will show that modern specialized sciences have a Hobbesian epistemic structure, one that makes resentment of scientific elites both predictable and (partly) rational. Modern sciences are so specialized that they force non-experts into a deep form of epistemic dependence, such that experts play the Hobbesian role of Leviathan, with unquestionable authority over certain epistemic norms. This parallel to political theory helps us see the tragic dilemma built into the reception of science in democratic societies. While we rightly resent and reject the unquestionable authority of Hobbesian politics, epistemic dependence makes rejecting similar authority in science untenable. But here the rational grounds for accepting scientific authority come apart from the rational grounds for resenting Leviathan. What remains is a rational residue of resentment, directed against the democratic inequality of scientific expertise. Failing to acknowledge the rationality of this resentment has left us poorly equipped to respond persuasively to science-denial.